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**SUPPLEMENT TO
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1. The Armed Forces of the USSR now total six to seven million. In the event of a general war this strength would be doubled to at least 12-14 million. Altogether some 140 million people would be kept at strength for the Armed Forces and for direct military production, while the balance of production, including agriculture, mining, textile manufacture, construction, etc would suffer. Such a policy would, of course, be short sighted in view of the present tightness of manpower and the deficiencies of production, but such would be the case in wartime. Then too, there would probably not be as much aid from the outside as there was during World War II. After the first six months of war, Soviet food reserves were exhausted, and we could not have gone on without the food shipped by America. Throughout World War II, I ate only American food, (including bread made from American flour), and saw only American food in the Army. At the present time, Soviet food reserves are lower than they were at the outset of World War II, but I know that the Soviets would sacrifice manpower requirements in food and other production in the mobilization for the Armed Forces.
2. If, in estimating the strength of the Security Forces one includes both uniformed and plain clothes personnel of all security and police agencies, then, in peacetime, these forces have a strength equivalent to that of the peacetime Armed (Military) Forces, or six to seven million. In the event of war this strength would be increased but not doubled. However, there are two popular estimates of the strength of Soviet Security Forces - one, that the Security Forces have a strength equal to that of the Military, the other, that "one person in ten works for the Secret Police". If one includes in the latter estimate all voluntary or enforced informants, an estimate of six to seven million full time employees is not out of line. Even in peacetime the Soviets feel that it is necessary to maintain constantly, armed guards on all bridges and at all railway stations in the USSR due to a fear of the people themselves.
3. In the Security Forces a majority of the personnel is composed of Great Russians, although large numbers of Jews are employed and all nationalities appear to be represented. Ukrainians are considered adept at undercover work. In the Armed Forces under present conditions no recruits of Asiatic or Caucasian nationalities are brought to Germany because of the extent of their tendency

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to desert. They are considered unreliable and poor soldiers in war. In peace and in war in the Armed Forces, these Asiatics and Caucasians appear to be particularly mistrusted. Although all nationalities other than Great Russian fall under suspicion to the extent of being placed only in mixed units on the divisional level. It is my belief that because of this mistrust of the subordinate nationalities, in wartime Great Russians bear a disproportionate share of casualties.

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4. As for the value of the satellite military forces, I can state categorically that, among most Soviet officers, they are considered very weak and a bad influence. The idea that small Satellite units might be integrated into Soviet divisions is utter nonsense as they would weaken Soviet forces. It is possible that one Satellite division might be employed with about nine Soviet divisions but never alone, as they are not considered as capable as Soviet units, nor would they be used in anti-guerrilla operations for the same reasons.
5. In the event of a war, about one-third of the Soviet forces would be maintained forward, in contact with the enemy, while about two-thirds would be kept in the Zone of Interior and along the LOC. Soviet divisions in strategic locations in the USSR (for instance, the Far East, Central Asia, Caucasus, etc) would not be touched in the event of war due to the fact that the fear of subversion within is as strong an influencing factor as the fear of invasion from abroad.
6. In the Soviet Army today, there is no cohesion between the Officer Corps and the enlisted men such as that which existed during World War II when officers and men shared the same hardships and deprivations. The bonds of sympathy and loyalty that were created then so worried the regime that every effort was made to increase the economic advantages and privileges of all grades of commissioned officers and to accentuate the differences between commissioned and enlisted personnel. It is my opinion that this has been detrimental to the combat efficiency of the troops. I believe that the regime is more fearful of the Army than of the mass of the people, and that there will be no war now because of this mistrust of the Army. If things become too bad, because of the failure of wartime production to satisfy economic requirements, I believe that the Army would attempt a coup d'etat and I believe also that, despite the growing cleavage between enlisted personnel and the Officer Corps, most enlisted men would tend to side with the officers rather than with the civilian regime.

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